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DEBATE
COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
PRO AND CON
In this thoughtful and intricate cross-disciplinary debate, Professors Eric W. Orts, of Penn’s Wharton School, and Cary Coglianese, of
Penn’s Law School, discuss the benefits and disadvantages of collaborative public policy decision making in the environmental context. It
is no exaggeration to say that each year the world grows ever more
aware of the nature of the environmental problems we face, and yet
critical policy solutions continue to remain beyond the grasp of even
the most interested parties.
Professor Orts argues that it is time to embrace a different policymaking approach—that of collaborative environmental lawmaking.
He argues that “the view that centralized governments acting alone
will arrive at ‘correct’ solutions . . . begs the question of incommensurable values and the various people who hold them.” Professor
Orts’s skepticism of the independence of political and other governmental actors in a world in which “lobbyists and campaign financiers .
. . play large and often decisive roles in th[e public policymaking]
process” leads him to conclude that “in many situations, it makes better sense to trust less in the traditional centralized process of environmental lawmaking and to consider more frequently the alternative
of engaging in collaborative environmental law.”
Professor Coglianese responds that collaborative environmental
law is “not at all feasible for making real-world decisions about major
environmental problems,” and that this policymaking approach “introduces new types of predictable and serious problems.” He cautions
that “[t]he issue is not whether policymakers should reach out to affected interests and members of the public. Rather, the issue lies with
the purpose of public engagement.” Professor Coglianese contends
that, by making agreement the primary aim of policymaking, collaborative environmental law actually conveys a willingness to give in to interested parties in pursuit of the “holy grail” of consensus. Instead,
Professor Coglianese urges that public “engagement should be used
with another goal in mind . . . mak[ing] the best possible decision [to]
. . . best advance[] the overall public interest.”
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OPENING STATEMENT
The Case for Collaborative Environmental Law
Eric W. Orts

†

A recent suggestion put forward by a number of academics has
been to consider one or another version of what I will call “collaborative environmental law” to address different kinds of environmental
problems. Different labels have been used to describe this approach,
including an emphasis on contracting, negotiating, and bargaining as
methods of “doing” environmental law. I will use the term “collaborative environmental law” to refer to a general form of lawmaking that
adopts a deliberative and participatory process designed to include
not only government officials (and their designated scientific and
economic experts), but also the representatives of a range of interests
in civil society who will be affected by legal rules and decisions concerning a specific environmental problem, including businesses, citizens’ groups, and nongovernmental organizations. The principal aim
of such a collaborative process is to arrive at a negotiated deal or
agreement about how to treat a particular environmental problem in
its specific context. My general claim is that this approach can work
well for a large number of modern environmental problems. I do not
claim that collaborative environmental law should replace traditional
environmental law as the best approach to all problem contexts and
situations. But I argue that this approach makes sense for at least
some kinds of environmental problems in contrast to more traditional
methods of lawmaking—namely, common law development, federal
or state legislation, international treaties, and formal or informal administrative regulation.
Allow me first to argue against a few epistemological assumptions
that some policymakers and academics make about the “best” way to
do environmental law. These assumptions tend to reinforce traditional approaches. Many academics harbor a false confidence in the
superiority of modern science and economics to provide concrete,
generalized answers to most, if not all, environmental policy questions. I believe instead that in many circumstances, there are no
“right answers” to be given by science or economics to many specific
environmental problems. As a result, a centralized lawmaking ap†

Guardsmark Professor, Legal Studies and Business Ethics Department, The
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
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proach directed by allegedly “expert” government officials cannot be
relied upon to yield objectively correct solutions. Decentralized approaches to environmental law would conform more closely to the descriptive and normative complexity of the problems.
Science and economics are helpful to diagnose some important
dimensions of issues. For example, science can provide reliable evidence that exposure to particular chemicals in sufficient doses is likely
to prove harmful to human health (as well as to other animals and
plants). In other words, scientific methods estimate and quantify environmental risks. But science cannot provide answers to questions
about how much risk is too much to impose on a particular population in specific situations. Environmental risks are instead routinely
balanced against other considerations, such as convenience, voluntariness of the assumption of the risk, and economic values.
Similarly, economic analysis can provide useful information about
how much a proposed environmental solution or prophylactic measure may cost, as well as an approximation of some of the benefits of
reducing environmental pollution or other risks. But economic analysis cannot capture all of the values relevant to a particular environmental choice. When economics attempts to capture these noneconomic values—such as natural beauty or an ethical appreciation of
biodiversity—it fails. A notorious example is the use of “contingent
valuation” to attempt to measure the value of a pristine natural feature in hypothetical dollars, such as in the survey question, “How
much would you be willing to pay for a clear view of the Grand Canyon?” Simply to ask the question is to miss the point.
Given the space constraints here, I will simply assert rather than
argue for the position that the imperial views of either science or economics (or both together) cannot yield final policy answers to many of
the most difficult environmental problems. Instead, these problems
often involve a clash of values—pitting environmentalists against business firms, citizens against consumers—with the government frequently in the middle. Adding to the complexity, governments operate at different levels: local, regional, national, and global. When
competing values are implicated—what my Wharton colleague, Professor Nien-hê Hsieh, describes well as “incommensurable values”—
they cannot be reduced to a common currency and traded off to find
one correct, objectively rational solution. Instead, different risks and
benefits have to be identified and negotiated, and tough choices must
often be made. When there is no objectively right answer, then both
individuals and society must “muddle through” (to use Professor
Charles Lindblom’s famous phrase) and try to find the best practical
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answer possible for difficult problems. The best approach discovered
so far has been to apply deliberative, participatory democratic processes to yield negotiated compromises to address specific kinds of
problems.
What does a collaborative approach to environmental law mean in
practice? Allow me to describe a general method and provide a few
illustrations.
First, one should start with a definition of the problem context
and features of a particular environmental issue. Important dimensions include the size and scale of the problem, its nature in terms of a
physical and scientific understanding, the economic interests at stake,
the political considerations involved, and the different kinds of values
implicated.
Centralized regulatory approaches often assume that the nationstate—embodied by the United States government or unitary national
governments elsewhere—is the appropriate place to start. The context in which different kinds of environmental issues arise, however,
may recommend a focus at lower or higher governmental levels. The
principle of “subsidiarity,” originated in Europe, is helpful here. It
recommends that any specific environmental problem should be addressed at the lowest governmental level possible. The reason is that
the complexity of many environmental problems is more easily and
more satisfactorily resolved at a smaller scale, if feasible. For some
problems, such as global climate change or ozone-layer depletion, the
relevant definition of the problem context is planetary. For others,
such as the siting of a power plant or a waste processing facility, the
appropriate level is often local or regional.
Second, once the problem context is defined and understood, the
next step is to identify and convene the relevant interests to address
the issue. Governmental actors will often need to play a leading role
because those who are contributing to an environmental problem may
not always be willing to convene voluntarily. Privately oriented businesses and individuals tend to deny the harmful public consequences
of their actions. Collective action problems and the well-known “tragedy of the commons” describe most environmental problems, and often it is only the government—as the maker and enforcer of coercive
law—which can effectively bring everyone to the negotiating table.
At this point, however, some scholars and policymakers quickly
abdicate and prefer to delegate large powers to the government to
“solve” a particular environmental problem through the application of
alleged scientific and economic expertise. Thus the regulatory state is
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born and expands, encouraging and encouraged by imperial claims of
scientific and economic methodologies (sometimes devolving into
ideologies) to supply policy answers. It is true that governmental
agencies can frequently produce and collect relevant scientific and
economic information efficiently and objectively. But the view that
centralized governments acting alone will arrive at “correct” solutions—even if a notice-and-comment procedure solicits a range of
opinions in the promulgation of administrative regulations—begs the
question of incommensurable values and the various people who hold
them. Democratic legislatures and executives may have the imprimatur of legitimacy through periodic elections, but everyone knows that
lobbyists and campaign financiers (if not their seedier relatives who
engage in old-fashioned bribery and corruption) play large and often
decisive roles in this process such that the government’s position on
many issues is often determined behind the scenes. The ideal of a
truly objective Environmental Protection Agency or Office of Management and Budget is a myth.
Therefore, in many situations, it makes better sense to trust less in
the traditional centralized process of environmental lawmaking and to
consider more frequently the alternative of engaging in collaborative
environmental law. Again, a collaborative process will not always
work. Sometimes a big problem may require a big government solution. However, in a world in which many environmental problems
have become increasingly complex (and often seemingly intractable),
it makes sense to expand our thinking. Creative and effective solutions to specific problems may result from collaborative engagement
in good faith among interested parties, even when their fundamental
values may differ. In a world in which a religious-like belief in science
or economics as infallible disciplines that give definitive answers to big
policy questions has been exploded, there is really no other choice.
To address many of the serious environmental problems that face the
world today, there is no better course than for everyone involved to sit
down, talk and listen to each other, and work out compromise solutions with legally enforceable consequences in the various contexts in
which these problems arise.
Advantages for collaborative environmental law include a greater
sensitivity to encouraging innovation and creativity, rather than relying on previous approaches or borrowing from old laws or precedents
of dubious effectiveness, as well as a more active engagement of both
the “regulated” and the “regulators” in committing to new regulatory
schemes. Balancing different values through deliberation and negotiation may lead to new “win-win” solutions or other compromises that
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hurt one side or another less than they might otherwise be hurt (e.g.,
a regulation that is either less costly or more respectful of the environment and therefore a “second best” if not a “first best” option).
Collaborative environmental law may also help to elude the wellknown “ossification” of traditional administrative regulation and hamstrung, slow-moving legislatures.
There are also potential disadvantages of collaboration, and they
may sometimes outweigh the benefits. For example, collaborative
administrative law in the form of negotiated rule making has been
criticized as too time-consuming and expensive. The increased economic cost of any particular method of regulation is certainly relevant,
and sometimes this consideration may be decisive. But it’s not the
only value that should be measured.
Also, collaborative environmental law addressing similar issues in
different places may yield inconsistent results. In the siting of power
plants or waste facilities, for instance, some communities may choose
to accept a greater degree of health risk than others. In this context,
it may make sense for centrally determined regulations to specify
minimal levels of safety for certain risks and then to allow collaborative negotiated solutions to proceed within these limits. Or, to take
another example, some “habitat conservation plans” to preserve endangered species may turn out to be less effective than others, an inevitable result of applying different solutions in different situations.
Lawyers may tend to overvalue consistency, however, and this hobgoblin should not prevent the use of collaborative approaches that make
sense and, when taken collectively, promise to improve the ability of
environmental law to address some of the most challenging problems
effectively, efficiently, and democratically.
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REBUTTAL
The Case against Collaborative Environmental Law
Cary Coglianese

†

Professor Eric Orts explains that the “principal aim” of collaborative environmental law is “to arrive at a negotiated deal or agreement
about how to treat a particular environmental problem in its specific
context.” This common understanding of collaborative environmental law provides the focal point for clarifying my concerns with
this approach to environmental policymaking. I have no problem
with policymakers encouraging public deliberation and seeking extensive input, nor do I quarrel with trying to increase participation or
policymaking at local levels, but it would be a serious mistake to establish deal-making as the primary goal of domestic environmental policymaking.
Let me first clarify one conceptual distinction. Collaborative environmental law may hold certain affinities with localism, but policymaking can be collaborative (that is, it can place primacy on winning
agreement) whether its scale is international, national, regional, state,
or local. Professor Orts’s critiques of undue centralized national policymaking, and his invocation of the European subsidiarity principle,
are thoughtful and perhaps even persuasive, but they do not help in
deciding whether to favor collaboration. Collaboration requires its
own separate defense.
Given this, why would criticisms of centralized, national policymaking find their way into a defense of collaboration? They appear to
serve the same purpose as Professor Orts’s discussion of science’s inability to generate determinate policy answers. They make collaboration look good by making the alternative look bad. Indeed, much of
Professor Orts’s case for collaborative environmental law is actually a
case against the unattractive alternative of having centralized experts
make major public decisions in ivory-tower isolation, taking nothing
into account but cold scientific and economic facts.
There are choices other than decision making by quarantined
central planners and decision making by collaboration. Without treating public deliberation as a negotiation, and without viewing their

†

Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, University of
Pennsylvania Law School; Director, Penn Program on Regulation.
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primary objective as the brokering of a deal, policymakers can, and
regularly do, engage in extensive consultation and engagement. They
hold public hearings and convene interactive roundtable dialogues to
gather information that can improve their decisions. They pick up
the telephone, ask questions of affected individuals and organizations,
and listen to what they have to say. Policymakers not only meet individually with affected interests, they also consult with elected and appointed officials from other governmental bodies. All of these efforts
to obtain input come in addition to the normal review of feedback accompanying the formal notice-and-comment procedure used by administrative agencies.
To question collaboration, then, is not to question public participation. The issue is not whether policymakers should reach out to affected interests and members of the public. Rather, the issue lies with
the purpose of public engagement. Should public engagement be pursued in order to base environmental law on a deal struck by certain
affected parties? Or should such engagement be used with another
goal in mind, such as gathering information policymakers need to
make the best possible decision consistent with relevant statutory objectives or with what best advances the overall public interest?
Professor Orts favors making agreement the principal aim of
many significant environmental policies because, he says, “there is no
better course than for everyone involved to sit down, talk and listen to
each other, and work out compromise solutions.” As appealing as this
Rawlsian aspiration may be, it is not at all feasible for making realworld decisions about major environmental problems. Environmental
impacts are inherently diffuse, affecting large numbers of people; it is
simply not possible for everyone affected by major environmental
problems to sit down and talk things over. As a result, even when a
collaborative environmental process is used to achieve agreement, the
broader public is not necessarily well served by what the selective
group of interested parties sitting around the negotiation table decides.
Professor Orts suggests that placing a primacy on agreement can
better encourage participants to find creative “win-win” solutions, as
well as provide a better opportunity for breaking governmental gridlock. Negotiated decisions may indeed be better in comparison to decisions made by government officials who lock themselves in their
closets when developing new policies. But officials don’t do this, and I
am aware of no credible evidence showing that the quixotic quest for
consensus leads to better policy outcomes when compared to the real-
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istic alternative of government decision making following robust public participation. On the contrary, what we know from past attempts
at collaborative environmental law is that making agreement the goal
often introduces one or more of at least five types of policy problems.
1. Tractability over Importance
When agreement is the goal, collaborative groups tend to give
more attention to those issues that are most tractable—not necessarily
those that are most important. I have written elsewhere about this
problem in connection with two major consensus-based initiatives
from the 1990s. The Enterprise for the Environment (E4E) initiative
launched by former United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) Administrator William Ruckelshaus sought to forge agreement
between business, government, and environmentalists on a diagnosis
of problems with existing environmental law and on specific legislative
remedies. When these objectives proved too controversial, E4E focused instead on the more attainable (but much less useful) goal of
drafting a broad vision statement for an ideal environmental protection system. A similar fate befell the EPA’s major, four-year undertaking called the Common Sense Initiative (CSI). CSI sought to develop
consensus over ways to transform the current system of environmental
regulation in six sectors; however, in the end, CSI only really produced narrow, tractable projects, such as the development of training
manuals, case studies, and public education campaigns.
2. Imprecision
People can often more easily reach agreement over imprecise
terms. Each side can interpret vague words or broad principles in a
light favorable to its own interests, each thinking it has won more (or
lost less) than its counterparts think. When agreement is the principal goal, we can expect to see resulting outcomes that have greater
ambiguities. For example, in the E4E initiative, the final consensus
report read like little more than a book of platitudes. Few could seriously disagree with E4E’s general call for a better environmental protection system, but the devil (and the conflict) lay in the details that
had been pushed aside in order to reach agreement.
3. Lowest Common Denominator
When securing agreement becomes the primary aim, each party
effectively gains a veto over the outcome. If an agreement does result,
it is likely to reflect little more than the lowest common denominator
of the various parties. In this way, the turn to collaborative environmental law would transform domestic environmental decision making
into something akin to multilateral decision making at the international level. Whether in negotiating treaties or reaching agreement in
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the United Nations Security Council, it is not uncommon for multilateral action to reflect no more than what is acceptable to the actor with
the greatest objections. As evidenced by the international community’s response to global climate change, this is hardly a promising way
to make progress solving major environmental problems.
4. Increased Time and Resources
As Professor Orts notes, collaborative environmental law has been
criticized for taking longer to generate decisions. If each party effectively holds a veto, then much time will be needed for all negotiating
parties to present their concerns and hear how others respond. To
reach agreement, deliberation needs to continue until everyone
agrees or decides they can live with an outcome. Empirical studies of
federal negotiated rule making confirm that seeking consensus does
not speed up the policymaking process. Complaints about the
amount of time and energy demanded of participants in collaborative
environmental processes are legion.
5. Additional Conflict
Although collaborative environmental law seeks to resolve conflict, it actually can add new and unproductive sources of controversy.
For example, conflicts arise over who gets to participate in collaborative groups; in some cases, lawsuits have been threatened or even filed
when organizations are not invited to sit at the negotiation table. Further, even when a deal is successfully brokered, conflicts arise over the
precise meaning of what the parties agreed to and whether subsequent governmental action comports with that understanding. Neither of these additional sources of conflict arises outside the context
of collaborative environmental law. Perhaps not surprisingly, empirical research shows that negotiated environmental regulations are challenged in court more frequently than comparable regulations formulated through alternative participatory procedures.
These five pathologies of collaboration arise not only with major
federal initiatives but also with regional, state, and local attempts to
make agreement the basis of public policy. When California’s legislature unanimously passed a bill restructuring the state’s electricity
markets in the mid-1990s, for example, it enacted a compromise solution that had been forged in an unusual “multi-stakeholder” negotiation process convened by the relevant legislative committee. When
rolling electricity blackouts occurred in 2001, wreaking havoc on the
state’s consumers and forcing utility companies into financial crisis,
Californians discovered the deal’s serious flaws.
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Collaborative policymaking is clearly no panacea. On this point,
Professor Orts would surely agree, as he quite sensibly recognizes that
at least sometimes collaboration’s disadvantages outweigh its asserted
advantages. But in advocating deal making as the principal way of addressing many significant and vexing environmental challenges, Professor Orts fails to acknowledge the full extent of collaboration’s disadvantages. This is not to say, of course, that alternatives to
collaboration will always lead to effective and efficient outcomes either. Rather it is simply that making agreement the holy grail of policymaking introduces new types of predictable and serious problems in
addition to the risks of failure that will inevitably accompany decision
making over uncertain and complex problems.
The benefits to be gained from assuming these risks from collaboration are much smaller than Professor Orts suggests, if not entirely
nonexistent. For one thing, practitioners of the art of negotiation
have long advised against trying to negotiate over policy questions that
involve a clash of fundamental values. Most advocates of collaboration
have therefore favored negotiation only when policy problems have
multiple, discrete facets that can be traded off against each other in
hammering out a compromise. Attempts at collaboration seem least
likely to result in agreement in those settings where Professor Orts advocates its use, namely over problems that evoke conflicts over values
that “cannot be reduced to a common currency and traded off.”
Whatever conceivable benefits collaboration might offer can be
readily achieved by alternative means that do not introduce the distinctive pathologies that arise from a quest for consensus. As I noted
at the outset, there are other ways of making environmental lawmaking participatory without structuring it as a negotiation exercise. In
the end, if there is a case at all to be made for collaborative environmental law, that case favors instead ensuring that responsible governmental decision making is accompanied by serious efforts at public
engagement—not that it is replaced with the much different aim of
deal brokering.
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CLOSING STATEMENT
Eric W. Orts
Professor Coglianese does not like “deal making” as a method of
creating law, but one wonders what kind of political and legal process
he imagines taking place, even when the command-and-control legislation and rule making that he seems to favor are employed. Bismarck famously compared lawmaking to the production of sausage
and is said to have proclaimed that if you want to retain respect for
the law and enjoy sausage, then you shouldn’t look too closely at how
either one is actually made. In a modern democracy, the process of
lawmaking is often, if not always, a product of negotiations and deal
making at some level. One principled argument in favor of collaborative law is that it can be structured explicitly to recognize that lawmaking is the result of conflicting interests and values—represented
through various organized groups (businesses, industry groups, labor
unions, public interest groups, religious organizations, etc.)—and that
it may often make sense to make this process transparent. Professor
Coglianese attacks collaborative law as an unappealing form of “deal
brokering,” but one should then ask in return how he believes the
status quo works? I would suggest that traditional environmental law
in the form of national and state legislation—or the delegation to
administrative regulation—is just as much a product of “dealbrokering” as collaborative alternatives. But the deals are often made
in back rooms (though perhaps no longer smoky ones). Armadas of
lobbyists and special interests participate in the making of traditional
command-and-control regulation. In fact, back-room deals and danger of corruption arguably pose a greater risk in centralized lawmaking because the processes are more easily hidden. Collaborative law
offers greater transparency because in a public forum the arguments
that each side brings to the table must stand up to criticism. I therefore plead guilty to the charge of harboring Rawlsian tendencies to
the extent that I believe that we should create political and legal processes that support and encourage arguments based on a Rawlsian
“public reason” rather than assertions of self-interest and raw power.
Collaborative lawmaking, when properly structured, can help to
achieve this ideal better than traditional alternatives—at least in some
circumstances.
Professor Coglianese is right to point out that command-andcontrol regulation—and other centralized alternatives—can be struc-
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tured to include public participation. For example, the informal rulemaking process of administrative law provides for “notice and comment,” and agencies may sometimes take these comments seriously
and tweak the final rules in response. But notice that this process still
assumes that the administrative agencies themselves “know best.”
Hidden in Professor Coglianese’s defense of traditional lawmaking is a
trust in the expertise of administrative agencies as public servants. But
he doesn’t reveal the basis for this trust. To some extent—and again
in many circumstances—I agree that agency expertise plays a very
positive role in lawmaking. As stated in my initial argument, administrative agencies are well-positioned to gather and even sponsor relevant scientific and economic evidence. Their experience in drafting
good regulations and their collective knowledge of the overall framework of law in a given field—especially in expansive legal areas such as
environmental law—should be given credit, and, to some extent, deference (as recognized in the forgiving Chevron standard of judicial review of agency actions).
Notice, however, that Professor Coglianese does not say what
higher authoritative standard the central policymakers consult when
they make their final decision. He says that after soliciting information from the general public, the central policymakers will then “make
the best possible decision consistent with relevant statutory objectives
or with what best advances the overall public interest.” There is a big
jurisprudential difference between following statutory objectives and
doing what one sees as best in the public interest (legal positivism versus Dworkinian principles). But my main criticism of Professor
Coglianese’s view is that he does not reveal the foundation for his implicit faith in the virtues of centralized policymaking. My skepticism is
grounded in the reality that government “experts” are usually bureaucrats responding to heavy political influence (usually, in the federal
context, the President’s views and those of his supporters). If a Republican is in power, then administrative agencies tend to be probusiness. Democratic administrations tend to be more favorable to
environmentalists. High-level politics results in an unhealthy seesaw
effect that may not translate into the “best policy” envisioned by Professor Coglianese. Collaborative environmental law may sometimes
serve the public interest better by focusing on particular problems and
trying to solve them directly—without the determinism of “great politics” controlling the legislative and administrative machinery. Of
course, one has to elect leaders who will entertain using this kind of
approach when warranted. But collaborative lawmaking methods can
be adopted by both moderate Republicans and Democrats—and they
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have worked for parties of different ideological stripes in Europe and
elsewhere.
Professor Coglianese’s primary response to my plea to consider
collaborative law as an alternative method of doing environmental law
is to declare that I am on a “quest” to replace other alternatives and
that I see collaborative environmental law as a “holy grail.” But this is
a mischaracterization of my argument. I am not saying that a collaborative method (which is not, by the way, equivalent to “consensus”)
should replace all other methods or even that it should be elevated to
be the principal method of lawmaking. My claim is more modest. I
contend only that it makes sense to use collaborative methods in some
circumstances, and other methods (e.g., traditional command-andcontrol, market-based variations, informational regulation, or even a
“do nothing” approach) in other circumstances. By overstating my
claim, Professor Coglianese seems for some reason to feel threatened
by the mere suggestion that collaborative approaches may sometimes
make sense.
Professor Coglianese is also right to point out instances in which a
collaborative approach to lawmaking has failed to achieve positive
outcomes. I don’t know the details of the case of California’s deregulation of electricity (and I’m not sure how it fits into a discussion of
environmental law), but let’s grant that fundamental mistakes were
made. Collaborative law is, I agree, no panacea. But anecdotal evidence that a particular use of collaborative lawmaking didn’t work
isn’t dispositive—just as pointing to a bad command-and-control statute isn’t a convincing argument against the use of statutes.
Similarly, it is true that the Common Sense Initiative that attempted to engage industry groups in a European-style collaborative
approach to regulation did not lead to great success. Yet a postmortem might instead focus on what went wrong—perhaps with an
eye to whether the government wielded a credible or meaningful
threat of less desirable regulation if no agreement was otherwise
reached—rather than simplistically declaring it an example of an inevitably failed approach. Similar approaches seem to have worked in
Europe, and it might be worth inquiring about the differences.
If one looks, one can find successful examples of collaborative environmental law in the United States. Traditional approaches have
had an especially difficult time addressing certain kinds of environmental problems that involve many sources of pollution with many
individual contributors. Non-point source water pollution and nonattainment of basic air quality standards in major cities are two exam-
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ples. Given the long-standing intractability of these problems (responding indirectly to one of Professor Coglianese’s criticisms), it
makes sense to consider alternative approaches. A collaborative example appears in the CALFED San Francisco Bay program examined
by Professors Jody Freeman and Daniel A. Farber in Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795 (2005). As its name implies, this
program combined twenty-three state and federal agencies with jurisdiction over various environmental problems in the San Francisco Bay
(and Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta) into a cooperative effort
with other nongovernmental interests (including businesses and environmental groups) which resulted in measurable success, though it
depended also on political will to maintain it. The example highlights
a feature of collaborative law that Professor Coglianese overlooks in
his quick dismissal of the European idea of subsidiarity. For many environmental issues, it is important to focus attention on the right level
or “place” of the problem. Ecological and geographical dimensions
are often more important than artificial political boundaries. As the
CALFED case illustrates, different governmental authorities are often
implicated, and a “compact” or other collaborative approach can help
to achieve the coordination needed in the specific context.
In any event, Professor Coglianese should respond to my moderate argument that collaborative environmental law should sometimes be
considered, rather than setting up a straw man who claims that all environmental law should be collaborative. Again, I agree that collaborative environmental law has disadvantages as well as advantages—
costs and benefits in the largest sense of the words—but then so do
traditional methods. The five “pathologies” that Professor Coglianese
finds in collaborative methods can infect traditional lawmaking as
well. (What language can be more vague and symbolic, for example,
than the broad statutory goals expressed by the Clean Air Act and the
Clean Water Act? And the courts are filled with conflicts over the
meaning of terms in traditional statutes too, such as whether greenhouse gases count as “air pollution.”) Perhaps Professor Coglianese
would agree with what I am actually arguing: that collaborative environmental law is another possible approach that should be considered
as an alternative method of regulation in a complex world with a host
of different kinds of environmental problems demanding effective
and efficient solutions that are responsive to conflicting interests and
values. The scholarly debate could then move on to a more useful examination of when collaborative approaches have worked and when
they have not, which would then help to inform effective legal responses to future environmental problems. For example, Project XL
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was a collaborative approach to innovative rule making that was intended to encourage creative alternatives to standard regulatory requirements. My reading of the academic assessments of this experiment is that sometimes it worked, and sometimes it did not. The
same may be true for negotiated rule making, despite the increased
costs documented by Professor Coglianese and others. Some negotiated rules may be substantively better than traditional ones in addressing the particular problem involved. Proving only that negotiated
rules are more costly—or litigated more frequently—does not show
that they are substantively worse than traditional regulations in addressing particular problems.
I conclude with one final example of an environmental problem
that may prove more susceptible to environmental contracts or
agreements rather than centralized lawmaking:
global climate
change. It is curious that Professor Coglianese employs this example
as one illustrating a collaborative approach (unless one is to read him
as saying that all international law is inherently and defectively collaborative!). Instead, following a traditional lawmaking path, the
Kyoto Protocol attempts to enlist all of the countries of the world
(eventually) into a mandatory scheme to reduce the emissions of
greenhouse gases (mostly carbon dioxide and methane) that have
been scientifically determined to be causing a general warming of the
Earth’s atmosphere. In other words, the not-so-secret dream of Kyoto
is a traditional command-and-control solution with market-based
variations of cap-and-trade or green taxes included for efficiency. In
my view, however, the complexities of the problem—considering especially the fervent economic competitiveness among nation-states
and the harrowing divide between rich and poor regions of the
world—suggest that a command-and-control solution with marketbased add-ons is doomed. Instead, other regulatory methods may
prove more effective, including collaborative agreements among
companies to disclose and reduce their emissions (e.g., the Carbon
Disclosure Project), as well as smaller agreements among countries,
companies, and nonprofit environmental groups—perhaps under an
umbrella of a larger post-Kyoto and post-Bali treaty encouraging technology transfers and subsidies for the development of new energy
technologies, conservation practices, and adaptive behaviors. At the
very least, global climate change provides an example of why scholars
and policymakers should not bind themselves too closely to traditional
lawmaking models when considering new challenges. Collaborative
environmental law in the form of smaller environmental contracts,

2007]

COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

305

deals, and ad hoc arrangements may do more good in this context
than quixotic ambitions for a grand regulatory scheme to save the
planet.
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CLOSING STATEMENT
Cary Coglianese
Professor Orts and I would have had nothing to debate if he defended a notion of collaborative environmental law that simply counseled policymakers to act with humility. I would also have had little to
say if he were encouraging policymakers to try harder to seek out the
information and opinions held by those who will be affected by their
decisions or to do more by way of creating broad, interactive deliberations about policy options. I am not even sure I would have been motivated to participate in this exchange if he had defended a still
stronger principle: namely, policymakers may in some cases permissibly negotiate deals with affected interests, but only when doing so will
best achieve (or at least not diminish the achievement of) appropriate
policymaking objectives, such as implementing a statute or advancing
the overall public interest. Of course, Professor Orts probably would
not disagree with any of these other positions, but as best as I can tell
he advocates something much less modest.
I say “as best as I can tell” because Professor Orts objects that I
have misstated part of his initial argument. Whereas in his Opening
he claimed that collaborative environmental law “can work well for a
large number of modern environmental problems” and suggested
there was no better way to address “many of the serious environmental
problems that face the world today,” he now says in his Closing that he
only meant that collaboration “should sometimes be considered.” He
appears to be making a substantial retreat from his earlier claims, but
I am happy to let the reader judge. I will also leave it to the reader to
decide whether, in characterizing Professor Orts as advocating dealmaking for “many significant and vexing environmental challenges,” I
was setting up the straw position (as he claims I have) “that all environmental law should be collaborative.”
These accusations of mischaracterizations are just red herrings.
Fundamentally, my objections to the case for collaborative environmental law are unaffected by how frequently Professor Orts thinks collaboration should be used. My objections are instead animated by the
claim that policymakers should even occasionally assume dealbrokering as their “principal aim”—precisely how Professor Orts and
others have defined terms like collaboration and consensus-building.
As I explained in my Rebuttal, my concern centers on what a policymaker’s goal should be, and this concern does not disappear simply by
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saying policymakers should only “sometimes consider” an approach
that substitutes an improper purpose for a proper one.
In opposing collaborative environmental law in any context, I am
not naïve about how policymaking actually gets made. As a political
scientist, I am fully aware of the role bargaining plays, as a practical
and an empirical matter, in how things now work. But I am also aware
of the difference between is and ought. One can accept a positive political economy account of policymaking that emphasizes interest accommodation and bargaining, and yet at the same time deplore converting that descriptive account into policymakers’ primary normative
objective.
Professor Orts suggests that at least collaborative environmental
law moves deal making out of the back room. Yet if that is the underlying motivation behind collaboration, I would have thought it better
to advocate more direct solutions, such as strengthening transparency
or reason-giving requirements. Of course, even with these kinds of direct requirements in place, individuals who want to deal improperly
may well find ways to work around them. I see no reason to think collaborative environmental law could do any better to prevent motivated
individuals from engaging in subterfuge.
Professor Orts accuses me of overly trusting public servants. Yet
anyone who worries about abuses of power still has much to worry
about with collaborative environmental law. Policymakers still control
who participates in multi-stakeholder negotiations, and they influence
how problems get defined and agendas are set—deep sources of
power subject to much less oversight or review than substantive, onthe-record decision making. One charge I have heard made, particularly by groups excluded from collaborative processes, is that in these
processes policymakers tend to bring together like-minded actors and
seek to use the mantel of collaboration as a political cover for outcomes they already prefer.
When it comes to bias, manipulation, and corruption, collaborative environmental law might even make things worse in at least two
important respects. First, if policymakers are to be judged by whether
they meet the primary goal of striking a deal, they presumably will try
even harder to make sure a deal gets made—even if that means more
ex parte communications or illegal side payments. One thing participants in formal multi-stakeholder negotiations have reported is that
they can make more progress toward a deal by working in the shadows, during breaks and between meetings, than in the light of open
negotiation sessions.
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Second, if collaborative environmental law also means less centralized decision making (something Professor Orts appears to believe), it
will become harder to monitor policymaking and ferret out improper
conduct—simply because there will be more potential sites of corruption to oversee. One reason we observe so many instances of corruption and back-room deals in our capital cities is because the media,
watchdog groups, and government prosecutors concentrate their attention there. Oversight would no doubt become more difficult with
policymaking authority distributed broadly across a series of ad hoc
negotiating groups.
Professor Orts also says that by arguing against collaborative environmental law, I must be a fan of “command-and-control” regulation.
Perhaps some readers will agree with him. I have no doubt, though,
that current and former students of mine who read this exchange will
find much humor in his accusation. That is because, at some early
juncture in most of my regulatory courses, a student will use the
phrase “command-and-control regulation”—prompting me to launch
into a sermon against those words. I begin by explaining that I am
probably the only one who will ever counsel them against using
“command-and-control regulation,” as this phrase has become part of
the lingua franca of regulatory wonks and is used even by many excellent scholars whose work I respect (including Professor Orts). But I
admonish my students against the phrase for two reasons.
First, “command and control,” as an adjectival modifier of “regulation,” is redundant. “Regulation,” like law more generally, refers to
rules backed up with consequences. By definition it consists of
“commands”—not hints or advice. And every kind of regulation seeks
to “control” in the sense of shaping incentives and thereby inducing
changes in certain kinds of behavior or outcomes. Using “command
and control” to modify “regulation” therefore adds nothing.
Second, I ask my students to consider how the words “command
and control” are used. These words are almost always used to distinguish the writer’s (or speaker’s) own preferred approach from disparaged alternatives that are conveniently placed under the “command
and control” banner. Too often this phrase simply undercuts opposing views by applying a pejorative label to them, sometimes without
any accompanying substantive argument or analysis.
What I want my students to learn is how to analyze and assess the
impact of the crucial differences in the types of commands, the objects of control, and the nature of the consequences applied across
different types of regulatory schemes. Reliance on obfuscating or
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meaningless phrases like “command and control” impedes the development of better policy analysis and empirical knowledge about regulation and regulatory processes.
This matters because ultimately major choices about regulation
hinge on answers to empirical questions, where analytical precision is
crucial. For example, even though my disagreement with Professor
Orts centers on a normative question (i.e., whether policymakers
should adopt collaborative environmental law), our answers are no
doubt affected by empirical judgments about the consequences of
adopting collaboration in environmental policymaking. In my Rebuttal, I said that I have never seen anyone provide any credible evidence
that collaboration works better than alternatives, such as robust participation. Given that various governments have now tried to use collaboration numerous times over the course of several decades, it is
hard not to view the lack of evidence as probative of the merits of the
case. At the very least, it is clear that no case has yet been made for
collaborative environmental law.
The evidence that has accumulated tends to show, with remarkable consistency, distinct problems that arise when policymaking is
oriented around a search for agreement. Time and again, when advocates trumpet “successful” examples of collaboration, it takes only a
little scratching beneath the surface to raise questions and concerns.
For example, Professor Orts claims that the CALFED program has led
to “measurable success,” citing work by Jody Freeman and Daniel A.
Farber. Although Freeman and Farber did characterize the CALFED
program quite favorably, they also acknowledged that CALFED’s main
success had come in the form of new procedures and programs rather
than improved environmental outcomes.
A study posted on SSRN earlier this year by two Stanford researchers, Michael W. Wara and W. David Ball, “There It Is. Take It”:
Endangered Species and Water Management in the San Francisco Bay Delta,
26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J., available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=987544,
also casts the CALFED program in a much less favorable light. Although Wara and Ball are predisposed to the view that “multijurisdictional/multi-agency cooperation, and a focus on consensus . . .
have many potential benefits,” id. at 1, they conclude that in the CALFED program “consensus and cooperation have not produced results.” Id. at 35. The way Wara and Ball describe it, CALFED has run
afoul of the same pathology of tractability over importance that I have
found to afflict other collaborative initiatives. As Wara and Ball summarize:
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[CALFED] fails to internalize the costs of environmental protection to
agricultural and urban water users. Focus on cooperation has allowed
agencies to get things done, but the focus has perhaps been on projects
that can happen rather than projects that need to happen. As a result,
four years after CALFED began, the fish are little if any better off.

Id. at 1. This is obviously not the place for me, or Professor Orts, to
offer a full assessment of the CALFED initiative. Suffice it to say, however, if CALFED is one of the best examples supporting collaborative
environmental law, the case for collaboration is much shakier than its
advocates admit.
Professor Orts also brings up CALFED to raise a question about
how to deal with environmental problems that cut across existing governmental boundaries and jurisdictions. In cases where intergovernmental coordination is needed to direct rules and management
resources in a way that best advances statutory goals or the overall
public interest, then seeking agreement between the relevant governmental bodies is also presumably necessary. The same is true at
the international level where, by definition, agreement between states
is essential for creating a legal response to global environmental problems. If one has no choice, then one has no choice.
But this does not mean cross-governmental agreements are the
best, or even a desirable, way of managing resources when choice does
exist. Nor does it mean that any agreement is better than no agreement. Even in domestic and international trans-boundary cases, there
is absolutely no reason to advocate that government officials make
getting an agreement their principal objective. After all, it would
make little sense to take an ecosystem that wholly exists within a single
jurisdiction and parcel it up across other jurisdictions just to be able
to create opportunities for crafting agreements. But this is essentially
what collaborative environmental law would imply. As I said in my
Rebuttal, taking collaborative environmental law seriously burdens
domestic environmental law with the same quixotic collective action
problems that necessarily confront international policymaking.
For these reasons, the appropriate holy grail for environmental
policymakers should remain the attainment of the best outcome for
society. Will that outcome always be self-evident? Of course not. But
that is only reason to try harder, not to abandon the search.
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